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Abstract 
Vulnerabilities on smart multimedia devices that are made for homes and Small Office Home Offices (SOHO) and their 
implementation practices, are a pragmatic fact. The broad usage of various devices that operate in home and SOHO environments 
has introduced a new threat paradigm for consumer platforms and devices, aiming at the secure operation and information of 
home and SOHO networks. These devices include a wide variety of commercially available technologies required for their 
operation but also proprietary technologies tailored specifically for those devices. For many manufacturers, usability and user 
friendliness take precedence over the security on these implementations, leaving home and SOHO networks vulnerable to 
potential risks that are unknown to consumers or require deep technical knowledge to comprehend them. Poor implementations, 
along with the inheritance of vulnerabilities that already exist, aggravate these circumstances. This paper aims to construct a 
measurement method through known vulnerabilities and related attack methods, to provide a scaling system that helps end-users 
easily understand and be aware of each device’s vulnerability level, as well as provide a measurable score to help them compare 
devices that provide similar or identical services, in the same way this happens with other commodity features, attributes or 
characteristics. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of Universal Society for Applied Research. 
Keywords: Information security metrics;information security quantification; information security rating; home and SOHO attack tree; smart 
devices; public awareness 
 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +30-694-4552121. 
E-mail address: skavalaris@amcstudent.edu.gr 
 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of Universal Society for Applied Research
501 Stylianos Kavalaris et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  65 ( 2015 )  500 – 509 
1. Introduction 
Smart devices are already a part of life making the prediction for ubiquitous computing1 a reality. A lot of 
relevant studies and cases already exist2, which prove that such devices have vulnerabilities that can be can be 
exploited using well-known attack methods and tools. The more devices and points of entry are created on a home or 
SOHO network, the more opportunities there are for an intruder to find a way in. In light of the importance in what 
these smart devices have access to and what security risks may pose, it’s important to find a way to inform end-users 
and ordinary people so that they understand their security risk. The methodology developed to serve one of the basic 
drivers of the paper, which is to raise the public awareness in terms of information security risks.  
1.1. Smart devices definition 
“Smart”  is a word that is vastly overused these days for communication devices, appliances, home devices, 
residences and other buildings, as well as other types of devices and environments. The ability for the user to access 
the functions of an appliance or a device and monitor its status and settings from off-site, are most commonly linked 
to "smartness"3. Smart devices and appliances have various definitions but in general they present abilities like 
sharing information with other devices and systems, integrate with applications using advanced APIs and accessing 
the Internet or a proprietary network4. Smart devices also include a microprocessor and support the ubiquitous 
computing properties5. The goal is to develop home/office appliance systems that allow these units to evaluate 
conditions and then communicate status condition with the consumer or other appliances6. A smart home or SOHO 
environment can thus be defined as a residence, an office or other dwelling with automated or remotely controlled 
components (i.e. appliances and devices). Some "smart" components require a proprietary interface though most 
smart home features can be controlled by a mobile device or computer. 
1.2. Common input and output media of smart devices  
One of the most basic characteristics of smart devices are the input and output media. I/O media are the channels 
used from the device to interact with other devices or humans. Software-wise a communication can occur between a 
human and a machine using a user interface often provided by an operating system5. Most commonly, but purely 
indicative, they include network interface cards such as wired Ethernet and Wi-Fi but also other types of wired and 
wir eless media. Furthermore some smart devices incorporate other kinds of I/O media like sensors or other device-
specific media. Each smart device uses a selected set of available I/O media required for the device’s operation. 
Individual media or specific combinations of certain media pose risks derived from vulnerabilities. Also 
implementation practices from device vendors may pose additional risks for some media or create risks for those 
that are relatively secure. The approach on these indicative I/O media depends on the concept that: It does not matter 
which exactly is the actual medium but how this can be categorized based on a vector class classification that is 
presented later on this paper. 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Information security rating methodologies 
A number of assessment methodologies exist, each focused on different types of devices, based on a wide variety 
of parameters. A great amount of methods for risk analysis are without a complete assessment methodology and 
therefore produce no score. Other methods include the popular OWASP (i.e. risk-based), CVSS (i.e. metrics based), 
along with a small number of individual ones based on a variety of factors. Thus there is no specific methodology 
that can produce metrics and apply to such variety of devices, to date.  The OWASP Risk Rating Methodology7, 
follows the simple model “Risk = Likelihood * Impact”. OWASP provides flexibility for complex business models 
by adding new factors and calculating new varying weights for each new factor. The Common Vulnerability Scoring 
System (CVSS)8 is an open framework for describing vulnerabilities based on three groups (Base, Temporal and 
Environmental), apiece with various vectors. Each vector receives a variety of values and all the vectors are fed into 
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an equation to provide a score. The methodology focuses on the values of the respective vectors rather than 
providing a scale. A less popular methodology is the Threat Modeling method based on Attack Path Analysis (T-
MAP)9. T-MAP quantifies security threats based on four metric, (namely Access, Vulnerability, Target and Affected 
Value to provide a score) and incorporates more business-oriented parameters which facilitate security management 
and potential software implementation. Furthermore, Microsoft’s Security Bulletin Severity Rating System10, 
although a popular methodology, provides no score and is intended to inform all Microsoft users but in fact mainly 
enterprise customers reference it. Despite the wealth of valuable data each methodology provides, all are addressing 
IT security professionals and none inform with simplicity the end user. Furthermore other available methodologies 
and all previously analyzed, cannot evaluate the impact of unknown threats due to implementation flaws. 
3. Scope of this paper 
This effort aims to construct a novel information security measurement method that could inform end-users about 
the potential security issues that relate to specific commercial smart devices and also increase the level of 
information security awareness. This could be achieved through a simple visual indicator that could visually 
combine the joined risk for known as well as unknown vulnerabilities that could be applicable for that particular 
device. The scope of this research is to provide the foundations and parameters needed for the creation of a 
methodology that will lead to the standardization of measuring potential risk due to the usage of certain smart home and 
SOHO devices. This risk derives from already available vulnerabilities found in technologies used in those devices, 
potential vulnerabilities in generic technologies that vendors use, bad implementation practices or a combination of the 
above. Following the methodology, the standardized measurement will produce a scale that could potentially be used to 
evaluate each smart device. This scale could have the potential to be widely adopted by various parts of the smart 
device market such as the vendors themselves, end users/consumers and also by other areas.  
4. Description and analysis of input vectors 
By examining a vast number of smart appliances it has been concluded that these appliances and devices share 
common input vectors that are presented in detail on the following paragraphs. 
4.1. Physical layer: Wireless 
As per definition this paper focuses on commercial devices designed for end users, which can be interconnected 
with other devices. There are 3 different flavors of wireless standardized implementations found: Wi-Fi (802.11 
a/b/g/n), Bluetooth and ZigBee all operating at 2.4GHz.  There are also other implementations operating at higher 
frequencies such as 802.11ac or some implementations of 802.11n that operate at 5GHz, as well as other versions of 
the 802.11 standard that are not yet found in Smart Devices, that operate in various frequencies such as WI Gig11 or 
White-Fi12. Due to their nature that lacks physical connection all these implementations can potentially suffer from 
interference that can be emitted from numerous devices operating on the same band (e.g. wireless phones, for the 
2.4GHz band), or specially crafted signal jammers, though the latter are illegal on most regions. Signal jamming 
usually renders the device temporary unavailable. Wireless radios can also be sniffed and cryptanalyzed resulting 
not only eavesdropping and information disclosure but also replay attacks and code injection13,14. 
4.2. Communication encryption 
The Wi-Fi Protected Access and CCMP (WPA2) that is based in the strengthened AES encryption15, has been 
proven the safest to date. Yet it can be forced if not applied correctly16. All previous versions of Wi-Fi protections 
schemes were proven substantially insufficient and problematic17,18. The Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) standard that 
was added, from 2007 onwards, in order to provide an easy way for simple and safe interconnection of devices is 
erroneous by design19 as the predetermined 8-digit identification code (i.e. PIN) reduces the range of possible 
combinations, from 10 million to a mere 11.000 due to a design flaw19. Also other erroneous designs similar to the 
WPS/PBC function were discovered, exposing protected networks with very little effort20. 
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4.3. Network facilitators 
With the term network facilitators we define all well-known traditional network protocols used in order not only 
for the devices to interconnect but also make installations easier for the end user by reducing manual configuration 
at a minimum level. Protocols like DNS and DHCP which are the most used can be found in smart devices with both 
Server and client roles. These protocols together with other protocols that are used in conjunction, such as ARP, or 
others used to ensure the network integrity, such as the STP which is being used to prevent network loops for 
devices with multiple network interfaces do not bear any security mechanisms by design and present inherent 
weaknesses not only by design but also if not implemented properly21,22,23. 
4.4. UPnP architecture 
The UPnP architecture uses common technologies and protocols for both networking and Web in order to 
achieve usable and flexible connectivity, control and data transfer among UPnP enabled devices, thus 
interconnecting different electronic appliances and devices in an easy and effective way. According to research 
results24, security flaws in UPnP-enabled network devices resulted the exposure of the SOAP API over the Internet 
and the exposure of more than 80 million devices via SSDP due to exploitable library versions. Also known attacks 
on both HTTP and XML25 prove that UPnP enabled appliances are potential exploitation points on a network. 
4.5. File sharing and storage 
Common Internet File System (CIFS) or Server Message Block (SMB) are the most common method of file 
sharing in smart devices. In fact CIFS is a form of SMB, but both terms are used for the file sharing protocol 
designed to allow devices to read and write files to a remote host over a local area network (LAN).  Over the years 
there have been many security vulnerabilities either due to implementation of the protocol26 and lack of support for 
robust authentication protocols, in preference to no encryption or obsolete and already considered insecure27. Thus 
SMB is considered one of the primary attack vectors for intrusion attempts28.  Web Distributed Authoring and 
Versioning (WebDAV) is another way of file sharing by extending the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) so that 
it allows clients to perform remote Web content authoring operations, thus making the web a readable and writable 
medium. As an HTTP extension, attacks to WebDAV bear similarities to known web attack techniques29. Storage 
devices can be used to exploit various vulnerabilities on smart devices such as deploying a modified firmware, a 
malware or another form of backdoor30.  
4.6. Console interface 
The user interface console is the primary means of interaction between the users and the smart devices. Its 
purpose is to allow effective operation and control whilst providing information about the device, the service 
provided or other. These interfaces have identified design problems as 80 percent of devices raised privacy concerns 
(i.e. transmitting personal information unencrypted) and failed to require passwords of sufficient complexity and 
length, 70 percent did not encrypt communications to the Internet and local network and 60 percent raised security 
concerns with their user interfaces31. As most interfaces are Web-based using html and JavaScript, common attack 
techniques like cross site scripting (XSS), cross site request forgery (CSRF), or using default and common 
credentials There are even cases where the console interface is hidden below a program or application for the user 
and no authorization process of any sort or use any credentials20. Due to its nature the console interface can also be 
vulnerable to code injection. The above mentioned attacks can result multiple payloads such as Denial of Service, 
Disclosure of information, Arbitrary Code Execution or even full compromise of the device or appliance32. 
4.7. Operating system 
Smart devices and appliances offer one or many services and in order to do so they operate under the control of 
an application specific or an embedded operating system. The vast spreading of the Android OS via smartphones 
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and tablets, lead to a branching out on media players and smart TVs but also more traditional home appliances such 
as fridges, cookers and washing machines. Many embedded Linux derives are also preferred by smart devices’ and 
appliances’ manufacturers. Of course there are also Windows and Apple iOS based devices as well as many clones 
of open source operating systems (e.g. WebOS) or scratch-built ones. Operating Systems due to their complexity 
often show security bugs, vulnerabilities and exposures due to erroneous applications, implementations or 
vulnerable libraries33. An Operating System that is not patched to date may result a serious security breach. The 
embedded OSes that are designed to be compact, forsaking many functions that installable operating systems 
provide and can be found by the form of firmware created to cover specific hardware and task scope. 60 percent of 
such devices did not use encryption when downloading software updates31, leaving them vulnerable to firmware 
manipulation. 
4.8. Identified custom services and common practices 
Apart from the traditional network services protocols and standards, modern features or transformation of older 
broadcasting methods initiate new industry standards and protocols, such as IPTV, HbbTV. Such initiatives found 
on commercial off-the-self devices, found to be built around html or java based solutions with concerns for 
implementations that are not tested thoroughly for security flaws or Software Of Uncertain Provenance (SOUP)34 
that may compromise device safety. There are already published studies showing that these implementations may be 
attacked using the end smart device which is able to render Internet content35. These implementations suffer also 
from Cross Script Request Forgeries because of their http based nature but also from erroneous implementations36. 
Some common practices among vendors’ implementations also include the existence of hidden administrative 
accounts on the devices or remote reset procedures (e.g. opening a network port37). These (mal)practices must also 
be addressed as they can be easily identified using common tools available on the internet and common techniques 
such as port scanning or brute-forcing. 
4.9. The attack vectors’ methodology 
There exist several classification methodologies and threat classification models that can be used to identify 
threat characteristics and attributes, implementation methods or resulting effects38. The methodology of an attack 
tree39 is not only well known but already proved as very efficient36, thus it can be used in combination with the input 
channels of particular smart appliances to build a master attack tree that can be used partially or fully on each tested 
subject according to its specifications and design, given the input vectors described earlier. The attack tree that can 
be formed using that information is shown in Fig. 1. 
5. Methodology overview  
Security rating sounds and is a very useful metric when it comes to a device intended for end-users. It is so far 
though, an abstract concept that cannot be measured or rated and thus expressed in a unique, simple and 
enlightening way. The rating methodology proposed on this paper is based on the quantification of measurable 
information security factors which are used as the input vectors. The motivation comes from the need to describe 
vague security issues based on various implementations with proper methodologies in a way that the result is 
expressed in a consistent, repetitive and comparable way40 that can easily inform an end-user about it, without the 
need of any expertise.  The aim to build an objective information security rating scale for smart home and SOHO 
devices. In order to make the rating methodology meaningful to the public, a risk-based approach was selected. This 
approach is based on some measurable or objectively quantifiable items. These are vulnerabilities, implementation 
flaws and impact on the provided service. The rationale for choosing this methodology is that it has to specifically 
measure among common parameters and denominators and produce a realistic and understandable result. It is 
furthermore envisioned to apply an efficient way to identify the risk level of home or SOHO smart devices to the 
public without the assistance of security experts or consultants.  Since every smart device has its own characteristics, 
the quantifiable items cannot be the same for all appliances. In order to identify the applicable items for each case, 
the “attack tree” methodology is used39,20. 
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Fig. 1. The attack tree for smart devices. 
The attack tree is built by identifying all applicable input/output media for the specific appliance. A list of 
potential input / output media (e.g. Wireless implementation, Interface, Networking facilitators, UPnP, Storage and 
file sharing, OS) was made through research and presented in the literature review. For each vector relevant attack 
scenarios are identified as well as their potential Vulnerabilities and/or Non-implemented Best Practices. By 
examining all vectors in combination with the applicable attack methods, the various scenarios that will develop, 
they will reveal vulnerabilities or non-implemented best practices and resulting payloads. 
5.1. Methodology steps 
When applying the methodology, the first step is to identify the I/O media for that particular smart device. In fact 
this translates into the medium vector of the attack tree. After identifying the I/O media, the next step is to build the 
attack tree that applies to that particular smart device. In the attack tree created, each of the main branches is based 
on the I/O media identified initially. The various applicable scenarios for each media vector should be identified 
creating minor branches each corresponding to a different scenario. Subsequently to that process, the methodology 
requires to identify the Potential Known Vulnerabilities (PKV) index from the CVE database. Each of the PKVs is 
then tested for the smart device in order to identify all Effective Vulnerabilities (EV) which in turn should be added 
to the attack tree, using a unique index number i for each one. The Service Provision Impact (SPI), indexed uniquely 
as SPIi, is identified for each one of the EVs, according to Table 2.The Total Applicable Vulnerability Rate (TAVR) 
is then calculated using the equation (1) where i is the index number of the EV. 
i
n
i
i SPIESTAVR  ¦
 1
   (1) 
     Table 2. Effective Vulnerabilities Service Provision Impact calculation. 
Impact on  the Provided Service Service Provision Impact 
No damage 100 = 1 
Temporal Non Availability 101 = 10 
Permanent device damage 103 = 1,000 
Loss/Leakage  of data / sensitive data 104 = 10,000 
Human Injury or Death 106 = 1,000,000 
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For the purpose of this paper the CIS-CAT41 seems more appropriate as an applicable information security best 
practice, due to the fast and easy installation and usage capabilities of the tool. An additional advantage is the large 
number of related metrics, such as “Mean Cost of Incidents” and “Risk Assessment Coverage” that the tool 
provides. Still, the selected tool set should be dealt as a dynamic “library” of best-practices, which selection is 
directly related to the specifics of each device. For each of the minor branches produced, the Applicable Non-
Implemented Best Practices (ANIBP) needs to be specified. Each of the ANIBPs will then be added to the attack tree 
using a unique index number j for each one. 
The Probability Index (PI), uniquely indexed as PIj is specified for each one of the ANIBPs using the equation 
(2), where 
x E is the effort needed to exploit that particular ANIBP, 
x K is the level of knowledge needed to exploit that particular ANIBP, i.e. whether Programming and Network 
Skills are needed and  
x T is the availability of the tools needed to exploit that particular ANIBP. 
)log(
2
31 jjjj TKEPI     (2) 
The values of the E, K, and T are set according to Table 4. 
     Table 4. Effort, Knowledge and Tool calculation. 
Effort  Knowledge Tool  
High (>24h) 100 = 1 Yes 100 = 1 Custom 100 = 1 
Medium (1 to 24h) 101 = 10 No 102 = 100 Publicly available 101 = 10 
Low (<1h) 102 = 100  No tool 102 = 100 
 
The Service Provision Impact (SPI), uniquely indexed as SPIj for each one of the ANIBPs, is specified according 
to Table 6. 
     Table 6. Available Non Implemented Best Practice Service Provision Impact calculation. 
Impact Service Impact rate (points) 
No damage 100 = 1 
Temporal Non Availability 101 = 10 
Permanent device damage 103 = 1,000 
Loss/Leakage  of data / sensitive data 104 = 10,000 
Human Injury or Death 106 = 1,000,000 
The Non Implemented Best Practices Rate (NIBPR) is calculated using the equation (3), where j is the index 
number of the ANIBP. 
j
n
j
j SPIPINIBPR  ¦
 1
   (3) 
The total score (MISRa score) is calculated using the equation (4). 
)log(10 NIBPRTAVRMISRa     (4) 
Finally, the MISRa score is classified on the MISRa class from the MISRa score using Table 7. 
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Table 7. MISRa classification depending on the MISRa score. 
MISRa score MISRa class Class Description 
9-10 Class A+: 6 shields Low likelihood for small number of threats that could cause  “Temporal Non 
Availability” 
8-9 Class A: 5 shields 
and 1 shield outline 
Average likelihood for multiple threats that could cause  “Temporal Non 
Availability” 
7-8 Class B: 4 shields 
and 2 shield outlines 
High likelihood for at least one threat that could cause  “Temporal Non 
Availability” 
5.1-7 Class C: 3 shields 
and 3 shield outlines 
At least one threat that could cause “Permanent Device Damage” or multiple 
highly likelihood threats that could cause “Temporal Non Availability” 
4.1-5.1 Class D: 2 shields 
and 4 shield outlines 
At least one threat that could cause  “Data Loss” or multiple threats with high 
likelihood that could cause “Permanent Device Damage” 
0-4.1 Class E: 1 shield and 
5 shield outlines 
At least one threat could cause “Human Injury or Death” or multiple threats 
with high likelihood that could cause “Data Loss” 
5.2. Methodology output 
The proposed methodology has been created to assist home users with evaluating a whole new generation of 
smart devices from the complicated perspective of security. Although smart devices vary in every possible manner, 
shape, purpose, I/O interface, connectivity etc., the goal remains the same, an easy reference to the security level of 
the device. To this end scales have been formulated, elaborate attacks have been estimated, security best practices 
have been assessed and many more steps as explained earlier. The previous statements prove that an average home 
user cannot appreciate or even understand the thinking behind this methodology and certainly should not.  
6. Conclusions  
6.1. Evaluation and future improvements 
The paper’s aimed value was to suggest and prove a novel information security rating scale that could be used by 
both manufacturers and the public. Manufacturers could benefit from this method that objectively demonstrates the 
level of security achieved through their implementation and thus indicating their competitive advantage. The public 
could benefit from a simple means of recognizing quality products secured from common security threats. The 
offered level of simplicity could also act as a means to increase the commercial products information security. There 
exist researches42 that support the fact that the usage of security ratings, such the one presented in this paper, have 
subtle effects on service providers and customers respectively and increase the social welfare.  
Assessing the efficiency of the proposed method, the objectivity level of the methodology results should be 
considered an aspect of paramount importance. It is therefore a definite advantage that most of the input vectors are 
well defined and thus objective. Still, few remaining aspects that may be seen having a more subjective nature can 
indicate areas of future improvement. These are the development of the attack tree and the identification of the 
various media, which may not be known in advance. Another topic of criticism can be the analysis and suggestion of 
a re-assessment process. Indeed, the number and type of threats that influence the implementation evaluation, as 
well as the attack surface at any given time, could change through the publication of new vulnerabilities or improved 
best practices. Hence, the frequency of re-assessment is quite important to reflect information security changing 
nature. Setting appropriate time intervals, could also benefit from additional research. 
One more area of further analysis could be the confirmation of the chosen scaling ranges. The logarithmic scale 
used to calculate the final MISRa score was chosen for making harder to achieve scores greater than 8 but also quite 
easy to achieve scores greater than 4 as a manufacturers’ marketing-friendly approach. Another advantage of the 
proposed methodology is that can cover known and unknown threats and vulnerabilities. This particular aspect 
differentiates the MISRa methodology from others evaluated7,8 and it is achieved through quantification of the 
implementation flaws through comparison with any chosen “best-practice libraries” (e.g. CIS). An additional 
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differentiating factor is the selected target group. Other methodologies10 focus on information security rating for 
enterprise infrastructures, whereas this paper focuses on information security rating for commercial products. 
 Considerations have been made regarding the entities that could reliably perform this methodology. Potential 
answers could include two certification phases. During the first phase only the methodology development team 
could perform such evaluations, ensuring consistency and objectivity. Any interested parties (vendors, customers or 
independent bodies) could communicate with the development team in order to apply and properly measure the 
security of any device. The second phase would expand the methodology usage to include standardized 
specifications to be used by any certified analysts, security product vendors, or application vendors in order to 
perform evaluations or self-evaluations through this methodology. Moreover, any parties interested to become 
certified, could submit an application to the methodology development team, providing the requested technical and 
procedural evidence required. The interested parties should also agree to adhere to all terms and conditions set by 
the team for any rating performed using MISRa. Future expansions could also use a broader range of best practices 
such as DISA – NIST43, OWASP44, SANS45, CSA46, adopted in the aforementioned order, which is based on the 
variety of the suggested security practices as well as their adoption difficulty. Finally additional input vectors and 
media could also be considered, analyzed and used to include cloud connectivity, voice control, as well as various 
sensors in order to accommodate the evolution of smart devices connectivity capabilities. 
6.2. Synopsis 
Current methodologies for information security rating have been found to be inadequate when used for raising 
the public awareness regarding the threats and risks related to smart devices. This paper presented a novel 
methodology for rating smart devices information security that could be used as the foundation for raising public 
information security awareness, as well as a marketing tool for manufacturers. While information security is seen as 
a complicated technical issue by most consumers, the proposed methodology manages to provide a simple and 
comprehensive way to understand and present the risks involved in the usage of any smart device. Moreover, it 
could also provide a visualized version to the underlying technical issues that could be understood by end users so 
that they will be able to compare smart devices from information security perspective. Technically oriented 
individuals will also have access to the bare technical aspects of each device. The earned value of this research was 
the incorporation of implementation flaws, through the evaluation of non-implemented best practices, with any 
known vulnerabilities, through the usage of updated databases. These features are much more significant for 
evaluating consumer smart devices than enterprise products, where there is much more awareness and technical 
skills to support the related process. Adopting this methodology could provide any industry related to smart-devices 
to take advantage of a new marketing tool, increase the quality of their products, through raising their information 
security level. Consumers and independent bodies could also benefit by raising the overall information security 
awareness and thus enabling the mitigation of a wide variety of threats that exist in current devices. This paper 
strongly supports its educational purpose to create information security and privacy awareness and training 
programs but also as a form of implicit learning.  
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